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A​BSTRACT 
 
The twenty-first century has seen a rise in populist leadership and rhetoric throughout the 
globe, with the United States standing as one powerful case. In many ways, populism may be an 
unhealthy manifestation of very reasonable civic sentiment — people want to feel respected, 
understood, and capable of living a life they are told a capitalist liberal democracy can provide. 
This thesis hopes to develop the “story” of populism from multiple perspectives, attempting to 
not only inform but change the way we approach the populist movement in America, and 
perhaps, the world. In Part I, I summarize and blend much of the core literature written on 
populism and economic change, developing the story that populism in America today has its 
roots in the significant techno-economic and cultural paradigmatic shifts of the 1970s. Social 
media and an evolving political philosophy, particularly among the youth, are also explored. In 
Part II, I iterate multiple predictive data models using roughly 20 dimensions of democratic and 
economic life in the United States as independent variables, with different definitions of 
populism as the dependent variable. I find — counter to what the aforementioned literature might 
imply — that increasing unemployment is negatively correlated with populist leadership (at a 
significance level of 0.05, no less), while the “civil society organization participatory 
environment” and “social class equality in civil liberty” variables are positively correlated, 
corresponding conceptually with the literature. Finally, Part III is a creative work — ​The Mind of 
Demos​ — in which a fictional college student allegorizes the rise and nature of populism in six 
cantos, complete with two fictional commentaries and a forward by a fictional professor from the 
future. Upon reading any or all of the three parts, it should be clear how important both the 
substance and manner in which we engage in discourse are in a democracy. 
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P​ART ​I​: ​A ​ ​L ​ITERATURE ​R ​EVIEW 
 
 
 
 
“The death of democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush.  
It will be a slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment.” 
 
 
― Robert Hutchins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Democracy is when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers.” 
 
 
— Aristotle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Chapter 1 
Populism: Key Concepts, Characteristics, and Concerns 
 
In his famous 1989 piece — “The End History?” — renowned political scientist Francis 
Fukuyama deemed “Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” 
throughout the globe looking forward (Fukuyama 4). The Cold War was over and liberal 
democracy was the ideological victor of the twentieth century, with more authoritarian 
philosophies seemingly in decline. I believe (with the benefit of hindsight) that Fukuyama’s 
claim was perhaps overly optimistic, or at best incomplete. We are in the midst of a phenomenon 
that now leaves Western liberal democracy’s future in question, not necessarily due to the rise of 
competing political structures abroad, but its own faults that may manifest as votes, as Steven 
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt write in their book ​How Democracies Die​ (2018): “Democratic 
backsliding today begins at the ballot box” (5). Populism — an anti-elitist, anti-pluralist, 
moralizing pursuit of autonomy and the claim of community — has surfaced like a cancer in 
liberal democracies, revealing a number of issues in this “final form of human government” that 
must be acknowledged if liberal democracy is indeed to prosper. In the following, I will attempt 
to both define populism’s most fundamental qualities and demonstrate the breadth and risks of its 
global spread, using the United States as my core case.  
 
Populism: Anti-Elitist 
Jan-Werner Müller writes in his timely ​What Is Populism?​ (2016) that populism is 
characterized by a political movement of self-conceived “morally pure and fully unified — 
but…ultimately fictional — people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way 
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morally inferior” (Müller 19-20). It is the elites who have both gained from capitalism and 
globalization and failed to sustain a way of life for the middle- and working-classes since the 
1970s, the crescendo being “a colossal failure of economic stewardship” with the Great 
Recession in 2007 (Galston, 7). 
Further, populists may label some individuals as elites who are not necessarily of the 
upper class, as Christopher Lasch explicates in ​The True and Only Heaven ​(1991): 
In 1975, William Rusher of the ​National Review​ referred to the emergence of a 
“‘verbalist’ elite,” “neither businessmen nor manufacturers, blue-collar workers or 
farmers,” as the “great central fact” of recent American history. “The producers of 
America,” Rusher said, “... have a common economic interest in limiting the growth of 
this rapacious new non-producing class.” (Lasch 509) 
This elite “knowledge class” (510) has itself carried many definitions and shapes, with Alexis de 
Tocqueville calling its members “irresponsible dreamers and fanatics” (511), Lewis S. Feuer 
noting their “acute authoritarianism” (512), and Daniel Bell referring to them as “the ‘technical 
and professional intelligentsia,’ whose skills had become essential to the maintenance of an 
‘information society’” (513). Charles Murray believes this elite knowledge class includes 
“politicians, judges, bankers, businessmen, lawyers, and doctors — at least those who were 
liberals” (514). These professions require higher levels of education, a certain loyalty to the 
establishments and practices that support their industries, and character traits some may 
characterize as smug or arrogant — qualities the traditional, right-wing populist working class 
often resent. For those who have been the losers in economic change, seen their values degraded, 
and felt their identities mocked, the non-producing intellectuals are clear opponents of a past and 
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better way of life, commanding influence over business, the family (517), and the media (521). 
In reality, this body of professions lacks the economic uniformity we often expect when using 
the term class, but its collective contribution to a full-scale, liberalizing paradigmatic shift in 
society is clear. Indeed, as Lasch writes, this ethereal class of varying definitions really “referred 
to a set of politically objectionable attitudes, not to an identifiable social grouping, much less a 
class” on which populists may pin their pain (515).  
 
Populism: Anti-Pluralist 
In addition to its anti-elitism, populism is also defined by its anti-pluralism. As Müller 
writes, “populists claim that they, ​and only they​, represent the people” (Müller 20). There is a 
single conception of who the people of a country are and it is the job of a populist leader to 
recognize and advocate for these legitimate people. Müller uses the example of 20​th​ century 
American populist leader George Wallace, who began his governorship by declaring “In the 
name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line the dust and toss the 
gauntlet before the feet of tyranny...and I say...segregation now...segregation now...segregation 
forever” (21). In this case, “the people” was defined first by race; Wallace played into the racist 
sentiments of Alabamans yearning for a bygone era.  
People may be categorized along many lines, including race, culture, and socioeconomic 
status. William A. Galston explains how the definition of the people can vary in “The Populist 
Challenge to Liberal Democracy” (2018): 
Historically, right-leaning populists have emphasized shared ethnicity and common 
descent, while left-leaning populists have often defined the people in class terms, 
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excluding those with wealth and power. Recently, a third definition has entered public 
debate — the people as opposed to cultural elites. In its U.S. version, this definition sets 
“real people” who eat hamburgers, listen to country and western music, and watch ​Duck 
Dynasty​ against “globalist” snobs who do whatever PBS, NPR, and the ​New York Times 
deem refined. (12)  
Note how well these definitions pair with our current heuristics in the United States, with Donald 
Trump indeed emphasizing “shared ethnicity and common descent” from the start of his 
campaign.  Bernie Sanders, a leading populist leader of the left, has continued to press a socialist 1
platform to aid the poor and siphon power from the wealthy, refusing to even receive donations 
from billionaires in his pursuit of the 2020 Democratic nomination.  The “knowledge class” 2
Lasch walked us through above reflects the “snobs” Galston describes as opponents of the real 
people, culturally.  
We should notice how each of the above anti-plural conceptions of the people only 
capture a portion of the state’s citizenry. Liberal democracies, by definition, are supposed to be 
representative governments that, at least in word, seek to capture the perspective of all people — 
The Preamble to the United States Constitution begins “We the People” for a reason.  A true 3
liberal democracy, as a political entity, cannot have anything but an inclusive, pluralistic idea of 
the people, so what are populists referring to when they repurpose the term? I believe they are 
building up what Yael Tamir explores as a “nation” in her book ​Liberal Nationalism ​(1993). 
1 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/donald-trump-announces-presidential-bid-trashing-mexico-mexicans-n37652
1  
2 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/08/06/no-billionaires-bernie-alone-among-democratic-frontrunners-san
ders-gets-no-cash  
3 ​https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/preamble 
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Tamir differentiates the state and nation, writing: “As Seton-Watson rightly emphasizes, a state 
is ‘a legal and political organization...’ while the nation is ‘a community of people, whose 
members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national 
consciousness’” (Tamir 59-60). At the outset of a state’s founding, a nation may very well be 
congruent with the state, in the sense that the founding body politic is ethnically homogenous, 
practices a common religion, or has shared values concerning the political experiment itself. This 
was certainly the case for the United States (granted it was a woefully incomplete democracy), as 
the citizenry was largely white, Protestant, employed in Jeffersonian “independent, smallholding 
cultivation” that “promoted social virtues” (Scott 89), and committed to a certain kind of “civil 
religion”.  As Tamir writes, however: 4
…history since the end of the eighteenth century has been marked by a series of social, 
economic, and political upheavals — migrations, the establishment of new states 
inhabited by more than one nation, and the inclusion of groups that had previously been 
excluded from the political process. All these undermine the identification between the 
citizens of the state and the members of the nation. (Tamir 61)  
History has indeed seen many changes and stresses to the composition of states, leading to 
different nations within single liberal democracies that can foster frictions between identities and 
ignite pseudo-tribal competition for a claim on the state, excluding the other upon victory 
(immigrants, the wealthy, the intelligentsia, etc.). 
 
 
4 ​Robert Bellah posits the theory that American leaders and the citizenry have — throughout the country’s history — 
upheld a belief in “the subordination of the nation to ethical principles that transcend it in terms of which it should 
judged” in his paper “Civic Religion in America” (1967).  
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Populism: Moralizing 
In keeping with populism’s anti-pluralism is an underlying idea of “the people” — the 
populists — upholding the single proper moral conception against a host of immoral elites or 
foreigners. As Müller writes, there “will always need to be ​some​ distinction between the morally 
pure people and their opponents” (25). This supports coalition building, galvanizing the concept 
of a nation. Such an aggressive claim to the truth of what society should look like, coupled with 
an intense belief in the propagation of that truth, is a reaction to the amoral nature of liberal 
politics, as “liberal democracy is conflated with the spread of a cultural liberalism at odds with 
custom and religion” (Galston 8). At least in the case of right-wing American populism, 
nostalgia for a more conservative, communitarian past triggers resentment toward the elitist 
liberal intelligentsia. 
Further, although such thinking is more often associated with right-wing populism, we 
may likewise note the moralizing tenor of the left-wing populists. Indeed, their calls for 
rights-driven policy items — such as universal healthcare or open borders — is a political 
manifestation of their moral conception of right and wrong, a belief in certain entitlements 
authorized by virtue of our humanity. And what is the end sought with such left-wing populist 
moralism? A society that maintains its ethic of economic egalitarianism and sacrifice in the spirit 
of communal well-being, with norms of acceptance guiding our laws and language (what the 
political right has derogatorily deemed “political correctness” or “PC culture”). The moralism of 
left-wing populism, then, serves as the heartbeat of what is truly a communitarian ideal — a 
powerful break from the mere liberalism the term “left” might suggest. In this way, both right- 
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and left-wing populism are defined not only by their moralism, but their communitarian vision as 
well.  
 
Populism: Autonomy & Community 
Finally, populists movements may be characterized by a search for life that harmonizes 
independence in livelihood with a strong communal bond. Many American populists miss a 
Jeffersonian-type of labor and civic life that engenders one with purpose and belonging, as Scott 
writes of the growing hunger for such a path: 
I suspect that the tremendous desire one can find in many societies for a piece of land, 
one’s own house, one’s own shop owes a great deal not only to the real margin of 
independent action, autonomy, and security it confers but also to the dignity, standing, 
and honor associated with small property in the eyes of the state and of one’s neighbors. 
(89) 
Although the pursuit of farmland as a means of self-authorship may sound antiquated or 
unrealistic for most citizens of the developed liberal democracies of today, this spirit certainly 
manifests itself in many other ways, from the rise of microfinance and venture capital supporting 
entrepreneurs to significant resistance to big business and economic change  to the growing 5
proportion of youth (40% of millenials and over half of Gen Z)  opting into gig economy work 6
5 ​Even with the economic growth an industrialized United States experienced during and after World War II, some 
thinkers were concerned that our focus on innovation failed to appreciate the utility society gained from smaller, 
humbler ways of life. Binyamin Appelbaum highlights this in ​The Economists’ Hour ​(2019), writing of future New 
York chief utility regulator Alfred Kahn: “...he defended the idea that the government should protect small business 
at the expense of consumers...People, he wrote, also had interests as producers and as ‘citizens of an urbanized 
civilization.’ It was not good for a factory town to lose its factories.” (172) 
6 ​https://www.statista.com/statistics/531012/freelancers-by-age-us/  
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specifically for the independence it offers them​.  As will be discussed in the coming chapter, 7
populists resent how liberal economics led to heartless big business that they feel has disqualified 
the life of old for populists of the right and future financial independence for those of the left. 
These characteristics of populism — anti-elitism, anti-pluralism, moralism, and 
autonomy within community — are not inherently unhealthy qualities if kept within the 
restraints of democratic norms and a strong deliberative culture. A healthy liberal democracy can 
be filled with people who do not care for the well-educated or powerful, who prefer their concept 
of the good, and who enjoy banding together with those who share a common livelihood or 
belief. That is not populism. Rather, populists are anti-elite in a way that can severely undermine 
political processes which may truly require a certain technocratic skill set. They define and 
congregate by skin or class, not by virtue. They resent those who cannot embrace their concept 
of the good and would not mind silencing opposition — severely damaging democratic 
deliberation and the acceptance of liberalism. Such cynicism, distrust, and poor communication 
are terribly destructive for democracy. 
 
Populism: A Global Phenomenon 
Why is understanding populism and its causes so important? Well, anyone along the 
political spectrum who finds the rise of President Donald Trump to be a painful, enigmatic 
anomaly in American politics is deeply mistaken. The populist rise of Trump is neither enigmatic 
nor anomalous, as these terms imply a level of mystery and rarity in a phenomenon (although I 
will grant that, for many Americans, “painful” may be a fair word indeed). The reality is that 
7 ​https://www.statista.com/statistics/917776/gig-economy-reasons-starting-gig-work-generation/  
12 
 
Trump’s 2016 victory is merely one within a wave of populist power that has stormed 
democracies around the world and there are good reasons for why this is so (the strongest of 
which I will explore in the coming chapters). For now, we might seek to appreciate this global 
degradation of democracy…  
 
Number of Countries With Populism in Power, 1990–2018  
(image: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change) 
 
The above graph was part of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change’s 2018 report 
“Populists in Power Around the World” and demonstrates how many countries have had a 
populist leader or party come into power. This is truly a global phenomenon, with populist 
leadership developing at some point in the last 20 years in the United States, South America, 
Europe, Asia, and Africa, including the likes of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the Five Star 
Movement in Italy, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and, of 
course, Donald Trump. 
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Further, even in countries where a populist leader (as defined by the Tony Blair Institute) 
has not necessarily taken power, populist vote share has risen significantly, as observed in the 
data below from Euronews…  
 
Some of these selected European democracies indeed have populist leadership while some do 
not, but in nearly every case populism as a movement has charged forward in the twenty-first 
century, with an aggregate increase in populist vote share of over 10 percent (Euronews). 
Populism is a widespread phenomenon today; some may believe liberal democracies 
need not experience its rise and some, like Müller, believe it to be “the permanent shadow of 
representative politics” (101). I tend to concur with Müller, but regardless of whether we want to 
build a new state that will never face a populist wave or rehabilitate healthy democracy within 
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our own, understanding the different triggers for populism’s rise will be invaluable. That is the 
focus of the following chapters, where I will look to present and analyze a number of 
explanations from various perspectives, from left-wing to right-wing to new entirely. 
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Chapter 2 
The Major Explanations for Left & Right Wing Populist Sentiment 
 
The last chapter attempted to orient us around what populism is as a global phenomenon, 
even parsing out what may characterize left- versus right-wing populism where appropriate. We 
can think of this populist sentiment or power as a dependent variable, motivating our pursuit of 
the independent variables that provoke it. This chapter hopes to begin that process, outlining the 
major explanations for populism’s rise from both the political left and political right’s 
perspectives. 
 
The Left-Wing Narrative 
Bernie Sanders may be our best example of left-wing populism in America today, uniting 
minorities and young people in a revolutionary campaign bent on addressing — above all else — 
what he believes to be problems of wealth and opportunity. A look at his policies  across 8
multiple domains — from criminal justice to the economy to education — ultimately has a 
significant foundation in the role of money in America and wealth inequality, proposing the 
elimination of private prisons, higher taxes on the rich, an increase in the minimum wage, the 
cancelation of student debt, and a crackdown on campaign finance, among other suggestions. 
 Indeed, that is the story of most left-wing populists — they are frustrated by growing 
wealth inequality and the role of money in politics (Galston 12). And why shouldn’t they be? In 
the case of the United States, the last 40 years have only seen these threats to fair, healthy 
8 ​https://www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-on-the-issues/bernie-sanders/  
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democratic life grow in their intensity, as Ganesh Sitaraman explores in his book ​The Crisis of 
the Middle-Class Constitution​ (2017): 
From 1948 to 1978, wages and productivity marched upward together.  But since then 
growth has far outstripped wages. By 2013, productivity was up 243.1 percent since 
1948. But wages had only risen 108.9 percent. Where did all the benefits from growth 
go? Between 1978 and 2008, 100 percent of the growth in income went to the top 10 
percent of Americans. During this period, the income for the bottom 90 percent actually 
declined. (226-7) 
Productivity has grown dramatically in recent decades; who drives productivity? Well, although 
it may be the highly educated or intellectually gifted who design or invest in innovation, it is the 
working class that has supported this growth with its tireless hours in shops, factories, etc. And 
yet, wages do not reflect the growth these wage-earners have facilitated. How can this not lead to 
some working class resentment toward the elites — the big corporate CEOs and “knowledge 
class” intelligentsia — who have profited off of working class labor?  How can suspicion of “the 
top 1 percent of Americans” not increase when their 1976 share of income, 8.86 percent, more 
than doubled to 21 percent by 2014 (227)? It should be no surprise that what could easily be 
called an unfair economic reality has provoked populist sentiment. 
This growing wealth inequality — compounded with America’s privately funded political 
campaigns — has severely weakened the function of its representative democracy, as Sitaraman 
writes later: “Members and candidates for Congress spend most of their time — 30 to 70 percent 
according to some estimates — raising money” (247). This inevitably leads to both diminished 
availability to the people and worse performance (248). Further, because these candidates need 
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money to win and hold an office, they are vulnerable to being steered by big money interests and 
wealthy donors. It would indeed be “awkward...to enter a room of people who gave $5,000 each 
to see you and then tell them you disagree with everything they believe — their priorities and 
their views” (249). Maintaining the purity of one’s agenda on behalf of the everyday citizen is 
nearly impossible. It is quite fitting, then, that left-wing  populist Bernie Sanders has emphasized 9
his abstinence from billionaire donors.   10
 
Shared Roots and the Right-Wing Narrative  
What makes the relationship between right-wing and left-wing foundations of populist 
sentiment interesting is that they share some of the same root causes and policy ends. It is the 
secondary “branch” causes (i.e. economic inequality for the left) and differing philosophical 
biases (i.e. political correctness or traditional family values) that begin to differentiate 
populism’s left and right forms. Consider what the rising economic inequality in America 
described above has stemmed from? Well, there have certainly been economic downturns, the 
aforementioned Great Recession of 2007 being the most aggressive example, with inappropriate 
credit rating practices and the big bank bailouts authorized by elected officials (supposedly 
acting on behalf of the people) only contributing to anti-elitism. As Chicago economist Luigi 
Zingales observed in the midst of a 2004 negotiation of America’s bankruptcy laws, “The sheer 
size of the largest banks...was translating into political power” (Appelbaum 158). Although such 
9 ​We should be mindful, however, that the issue of wealth and exploitation of the everyman has seen populist 
leaders from across the political spectrum speak along similar terms, with the aforementioned right-wing George 
Wallace supporting “tax reform and...increases in Social Security, unemployment compensation, and the minimum 
wage” (Sandel 298). 
10 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/08/06/no-billionaires-bernie-alone-among-democratic-frontrunners-san
ders-gets-no-cash  
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cases of elitist favoritism, greed, and capitalist malfunctioning have indeed served to amplify 
populist sentiment, the larger cause behind the economic inequality Sanders and other left-wing 
populists have emphasized is rather a decades-long paradigmatic shift that had its genesis in the 
1970s, with the rise of the microprocessor.   11
Wage and productivity growth diverged in the United States just as a new 
techno-economic paradigm — “a sort of mental map of best practice options...made up as much 
of an understanding of actual generic technologies with nearly all-pervasive applicability as of 
general common-sense principles that enter the culture” (Perez 16) — began to blossom. In her 
book ​Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital​ (2002), Carlota Perez discusses the 1970s 
as only the most recent in a series of technological shifts the world has navigated over the last 
250 years or so, ​first​) the Industrial Revolution, ​second​) the Age of Steam and Railways, ​third​) 
the Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering, ​fourth​) the Age of Oil, the Automobile, and 
Mass Production, and finally ​fifth​) the Age of Information and Telecommunications (18). These 
techno-economic revolutions have come with increased globalization, automation, and skill 
requirements.  In his paper “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of 12
Workplace Automation” (2015) David H. Autor explains how specifically mid-range jobs have 
been pressured by cheap foreign labor and automation encroaching on their tasks, leading to job 
polarization, or “the simultaneous growth of high-education, high-wage jobs at one end and 
low-education, low-wage jobs at the other end, both at the expense of middle-wage, 
middle-education jobs” (12). Autor also points out, however, that this job polarization has not 
11 ​https://www.tutorialspoint.com/history-of-microprocessor  
12 ​It was indeed a techno-economic paradigmatic shift in the late-nineteenth century that pushed many American 
farmers to organize the country’s first major populist movement, as Lawrence Goodwyn writes in his book ​The 
Populist Moment​ (1978): “A larger number of people [farmers] in the United States discovered that the economic 
premises of their society were working against them” (VII).  
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come with a parallel wage polarization, as the supply of labor for low-skill jobs is much greater 
and more elastic than that of high-skill jobs, causing wages to stagnate at the lower end of the 
spectrum while they climb at the higher end (17-19). The middle- and working-class of the 
United States and other developed liberal democracies, then, have experienced heavy job 
displacement and lower wages at the hands of foreigners and the wealthy, expedited by the 
techno-economic paradigm born in the 1970s: 
A globalized economy, it turned out, served the interests of most people in developing 
countries and elites in advanced countries — but not the interests of the working and 
middle classes in the developed economies, which had done so well in the three decades 
after World War II. (Galston 7) 
This is, finally, where the stories of today’s left- and right-wing populism begin to diverge. 
Indeed, in contrast to the left-wing populist focus on class, wealth distribution, and money in 
politics the economic change above has wrought, right-wing populists have rather emphasized a 
corresponding devolution in the nature of work and culture that spurs their activity. The strength 
of large corporations and rise of the liberal intelligentsia — the professional class — over the 
past century or more has increasingly diminished not only the role of modest, individual 
enterprise, but the ideals associated with such labor, as Michael J. Sandel explores in 
Democracy’s Discontent​ (1996): “An economy dominated by large corporations disempowered 
local communities and discouraged the independence, initiative, and enterprise that equipped 
citizens for self-government” (215). Pervasive liberalism and a corporate, modernizing America 
has pulled us further and further from the republican, communitarian substance of Jeffersonian 
labor (Scott 89), diminishing the economic autonomy of the individual and pressuring the values 
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of the social circles with which they identify — “the erosion of community as a loss of agency, a 
form of disempowerment” (Sandel 205).  
This far-reaching liberalism has not only manifested itself economically through the 
creative destruction of capitalism eroding ways of life for the farmer, factory worker, and 
craftsman, but culturally as well. As Christopher Lasch writes of the aforementioned professional 
or knowledge class: 
The truth about the new class, if we try to see it from the outside, is that its members, in 
spite of the diversity of their occupations and their political beliefs, have a common 
outlook, best described as a “culture of critical discourse,” in the words of Alvin 
Gouldner. They share an inordinate respect for educational credentials, a tendency to 
question authority, a belief in commitment to free inquiry, a tendency to question 
authority, a belief in tolerance as the supreme political virtue. (527) 
These attributes fly in the face of those who feel safe and satisfied with traditional hierarchies 
and dogmas (i.e. the spiritual leadership of the church or more patriarchal family structures), as 
well as complacent with minimal education and the trade their parents maintained. These 
individuals who become right-wing populists resent how their history, beliefs, and industry are 
degraded, deemed old as if to conflate age with inferiority. Perhaps, “universal access to 
professional status may not describe the ambitions of most Americans, much less an ideal of the 
good society” (Lasch 526). The political establishment’s seeming complicity (and even 
assistance) in the corporate press of modernization’s dilution of traditional values and the 
destruction of the livelihoods of those who uphold them produces, naturally, a certain political 
cynicism among the people, as “the varied methods of social control fashioned in industrial 
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societies have, over time, become sufficiently pervasive” so as to lead to “a gradual erosion of 
democratic aspirations among whole populations” (Goodwyn XIII). Such cynicism and 
resentment is what manifested as right-wing populism during the Gilded Age, flaring 
periodically throughout the twentieth century until finally gaining a foothold in the White House 
in 2016. 
Indeed, Donald Trump was wise to position himself as a man of the people (in this case, 
defined as middle-America, working-class folk) who faced economic dislocation and the 
dissolution of their way of life. Trump’s constant verbal attacks against “political correctness” 
are a statement against liberal tolerance, while his positions on immigration, tariffs, and 
international trade have made him a protector of both the domestic working-class targeted by job 
polarization and — to use the term in Tamir’s sense — the nation of white America.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Left- and right-wing populists share both a similar set of root causes and a good deal of 
policy implications, as Richard M. Reinsch writes in his article “Can American Capitalism 
Survive?” (2020): “American capitalism is once more under attack, this time from opponents 
seeking democratic socialism on the left and economic nationalism on the right.” What truly 
differentiates the two, then, are the secondary causes and philosophical beliefs that sit between 
the root economic and political stimuluses and their policy proposals. Consider the attack on 
American capitalism Reinsch explores. For the progressive populist, this is meant to combat 
capitalism’s tendency to move money and jobs abroad, dropping working class wages and 
padding the wallets of CEOs. For the right-wing populist, this is meant to preserve the aging 
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ethnic, cultural, and economic equilibrium of the nation. These are not unimportant differences, 
because even if they both get their way (with protectionist policies, for example) this would only 
be one step in a path towards two very different ideal societies — one more egalitarian with a 
vision for how we respect one another through our language and consumption, another prizing 
individual enterprise within a culture of traditional values.  
But what about new explanations for the rise of populism that are not necessarily tied to 
any spot on the political spectrum? Are these more difficult to pin down and perhaps more 
threatening to the health of democracy looking forward? That is the topic of the third and final 
chapter of this literature review.  
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Chapter 3 
The Other Explanations for Populist Sentiment 
 
The last chapter presented a story for how today’s populist wave originated, as well as 
how it flowed into its left- and right-wing tributaries. This included a brief survey of the recent 
history of techno-economic development and socioeconomic change, focusing on how it has 
fundamentally stressed the lives of the young and old alike. This chapter, however, hopes to 
focus attention on two other explanations for a rise in political polarization: marketable shifts in 
political philosophy and the influence of social media.  
 
The Public’s (D)evolving Political Philosophy 
In his book ​The People vs. Democracy​ (2018), Yascha Mounk provides some incredibly 
compelling data that sheds light on the atrophy of democractic support and liberalism more 
generally. Indeed, the “Share of U.S. respondents who believe it is ‘essential’ to live in a 
democracy” has dropped from 71 percent among those born in the 1930s to 29 percent among 
those born in the 1980s” (105). This alone signals the decreasing value of a liberal democracy to 
its people, specifically its younger generations. Perhaps more foreboding than the youth’s 
decreasing​ passion for liberal democracy, however, is their ​increasing​ openness to alternatives, 
as support for army rule among 18-24 year olds has increased from 8 percent in 1995 to 24 
percent in 2011 (110).  
Army rule is neither liberal nor democratic, and the fact that it has ascended within the 
political consciousness of voters is problematic. But this statistic is just one example of a larger 
trend, as Mounk writes:  
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On the contrary, young people in a broad range of countries are actually more likely to 
identify as radical than older people. And their attraction to the political extremes has 
grown over time. In countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
for example, the number of young people who locate themselves on the radical left or the 
radical right has roughly doubled over the course of the past two decades; in Sweden, it 
has increased by more than threefold. (120-1) 
I suspect that this attraction to extreme politics is driven largely by a pursuit of identity, 
community, and agency. In the United States, amoral, liberal centrist politics is regularly 
characterized as leaving little room for individuality or difference-making, often soliciting 
accusations that the Democratic and Republican parties are effectively hugging each other within 
a narrow yet lukewarm set of ideological boundaries. For the young and principled, this probably 
doesn’t feel like the place to make a statement. As leaders of the ideologically marginal, 
populists play perfectly to this sensibility: “The reason why populists and political newcomers 
are so willing to challenge basic democratic norms is in part tactical: Whenever populists break 
such norms, they attract the univocal condemnation of the political establishment” (115). This 
proves their loyalty to their radical cause and makes them an ally of the youth in prying power 
from the establishment that has alienated them both. The extremism of populist leaders is 
believed to translate into “real change” upon their election, and so to support the populist is to 
secondarily reclaim one’s own political agency as a young person.  
Further, I also wonder if the youth’s engagement with more radical political communities 
— preaching visions of morality and the ideal society — is at least partially a product of 
decreasing engagement in traditional spiritual communities that used to do much the same thing.  
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According to an American Enterprise Institute article by Daniel A. Cox, Jacqueline Clemence, 
and Eleanor O’Neil, “The decline of religion in American family life” (2019), Americans are 
generationally taking part in progressively less religious activities. Among those aged 18-29, 
only 29% grew up going to religious services, 32% prayed at meals, and 27% took part in a 
religious education program, such as Sunday school. Irrespective of the merit of any individual 
religious practice, there may be something to be said for the gap in identity, community, and 
moral language young people having experienced in their absence. Progressive and nationalistic 
populism offer young people camps of identity, effectively serving as proxies for spiritual 
community, with followers learning quotable statistics and political talking points like Scripture. 
Perhaps decreasing traditional religious practice, then, has also contributed to the youth’s driving 
radical politics.  
As a last note on political culture, it is important to clarify why I believe this is as much a 
contributing cause of populism as it is an effect. Yes, many of the processes explored in the last 
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chapter have frustrated the youth (and all citizens), such as big money and elites dominating 
politics or economic change slowing the path to independence. These realities may lead to the 
populist-friendly radicalism above. In such a single-loop model, it is thus an effect. I approach 
this changing public political philosophy as a cause as well, however, because with each shift in 
political ideology comes a new baseline from which the next generation functions and engages in 
political dialogue. Essentially, the public’s new political philosophy re-orients the context in 
which the causes of the last chapter operate. In this way, evolving political beliefs and norms 
become both politically palpable and expedient, shaping conversation and realigning votes.  
 
Social Media and Online News 
The rise of social media has fundamentally changed the way news, information, and 
political opinions are disseminated across the country and throughout the world. In the past, print 
news, radio, and network news were the dominant means of learning about political 
developments and, for reasons both practical and of taste, tended to limit the rise of fringe ideas, 
as Mounk writes: 
...the dominance of mass media limited the distribution of extreme ideas, created a set of 
shared facts and values, and slowed the spread of fake news. But the rise of the internet 
and of social media has since weakened traditional gatekeepers, empowering 
once-marginal movements and politicians. (Mounk 135) 
Once again, I believe it is particularly telling who is driving and responding to this evolution in 
news and media. In keeping with the aforementioned trend of the youth pushing for change and 
considering ideas outside the centrist formula, a report from the Pew Research Center finds that 
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50+ year olds get most of their news from TV sources, while 18-49 year olds find most of their 
news online (Mitchell et al “The Modern News Consumer”).  
 
Social media, and online news more generally, certainly have our attention, as “81% of 
Americans get at least some of this news through websites, apps or social networking sites” 
(Mitchell et al “The Modern News Consumer”), but what is most interesting and poignant is how 
social media has opened up news and commentary. Indeed, social media has democratized 
access to both sharing and finding ideas, with algorithms allowing seemingly any thought to gain 
traction with the right title and clicks: 
On Facebook and Twitter, content created by any one user can rapidly be reposted by 
anybody with whom this user is connected. If the content the user has created is 
sufficiently novel or interesting, even someone with few connections can reach a very 
large audience in a matter of minutes. (Mounk 140) 
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If mainstream network and print news are inaccessible centrists politics, social media is the 
egalitarian market of ideas, where everyone may offer and receive according to their ability. 
Although it is not inherently political, then, social media is a manifestation of the same spirit that 
so often drives populists; and, naturally, it has also been commandeered for populist politics. 
Indeed, “thanks to Twitter, Donald Trump did not need the infrastructure of traditional media 
outlets. Instead, he could tweet messages directly to his millions of followers” (144).  
There are two problematic elements to the use of social media for political news, 
campaigning, and commentary, however, that each make social media a unique cause of 
populism. First, statements or ideas with little to no basis in facts — “fake news” — may run 
rampant and with political consequences. Mounk notes Breitbart as a particularly powerful 
example of this kind of manipulation, as the far-right news site “stood at the apex of a large 
number of smaller sites that spread lies and rumors with even greater abandon.” (145). Headlines 
as ridiculous (and false) as “Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President” 
and “Bombshell: Hillary Clinton’s Satanic Network Revealed” gained traction (qtd. in Mounk 
145). With Trump as the populist candidate in the 2016 election, it is particularly compelling 
how his supporters were materially more susceptible to fake news than those of Clinton (being a 
more mainline Democrat): 
About 57 percent of Trump supporters in the group visited an untrustworthy site at least 
once, amounting to about 11 percent of total news consumption. For the Clinton 
supporters in the group, it was 28 percent of people visiting at least one article, for 1 
percent of their total news consumption. (Johnson “Data shows”) 
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Scott K. Johnson of Ars Technica also walks through data from a 2020 study by Guess et al — 
“Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 US election” — that demonstrates the greater 
tendency for those with a more conservative “diet” in news consumption to read more 
untrustworthy pro-Trump news (right graph). Note, however, how news consumers on both far 
ends of the political spectrum had a higher tendency to engage with untrustworthy news (left 
graph). 
Graph from Guess et al/​Nature Human Behavior​ via Ars Technica 
 
Social media, then, contributes to the rise of populist sentiment by allowing users across the 
political spectrum to both share and access unvetted news that can help to cement more radical 
beliefs.  
The second way I believe social media contributes to populism is by allowing individuals 
to develop circles of friends and posts that reify their own beliefs.  In a study done by Facebook 13
Research, of those who self-reported as liberal or conservative, only 23 percent of their friends 
claimed an opposing political ideology on average and only 24.9 percent of the hard news they 
13 This personalization and bias is clear enough for Facebook to actually categorize your politics: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/us/politics/facebook-ads-politics.html  
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clicked was “cross-cutting” (Bakshy et al “Exposure”). Unlike real life, where we may find 
ourselves buying a coffee from a leftist after chatting with a libertarian in line and holding the 
door open for a MAGA hat on the way out, our social media interactions are often quite curated 
and allow us to box ourselves into whatever is comfortable. For some, comfortable might mean a 
mix of left and right moderate friends and varied mainstream news, but for others it means 
surrounding themselves with people and posts that accept and reify their radical tendencies. For 
the populist, who often lives on the political margin, this is a means of validation.  
 
Conclusion 
Changing views in political philosophy and social media are two youth-driven and 
non-partisan contributors to the populist wave the United States — and liberal democracy 
throughout the globe — is sustaining. They represent a (d)evolution in the way we communicate 
and the assumptions or norms we take into our political interactions. More broadly, they join the 
rapid techno-economic change, growing wealth inequality, political elitism, and cultural 
transformation that have arisen over the past 50 years, shaping a new political landscape that 
demands moral answers from liberalism and responsiveness from broken democracy.  
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“There can be no daily democracy without daily citizenship.” 
 
 
— Ralph Nader 
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Introduction 
 
In Part I, I attempted to outline the primary characteristics and causes of populism, 
focusing on the American case since the 1970s. This account was a high-speed consolidation of 
some of the most well-known and important scholarship on the topic, referencing the work of 
Laurence Goodwyn, William A. Galston, Christopher Lasch, Yascha Mounk, and Jan-Werner 
Mueller, among a good handful of others. We found that many interconnected developments — 
including economic dislocation, cultural and demographic change, big money in politics, 
increasingly poor democratic representation, the expanding role of social media, and an 
increasingly illiberal public political philosophy — have all contributed to the phenomenon of 
populism. Part I, then, sought to piece together a lot of theory and analysis. But can we put this 
theory to the test? 
Indeed, after reading a good deal of the traditional literature on the topic of populism, I 
was curious to see if a well-structured, data-driven analysis of its theoretical causes might be 
organized. Perhaps, if both the theoretical causes can be operationalized as “independent 
variables” and populism itself can be reasonably discerned as either a binary or continuous “ 
dependent variable,” regression may yield correlation and a predictive model. Further, if a 
successful predictive model can be built, there will be numerous hypothetical opportunities for 
its application, from proactive policymaking to campaigning to investing. If only as an 
interesting intellectual exercise, attempting to build this model has merit, and so Part II will walk 
through the data acquisition, wrangling, modeling, and analysis of an attempted predictive data 
model for populism. The goal will be to test different time frames in United States history in 
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order to develop a model that effectively predicts the rise of populist leadership, finishing with a 
prediction for the United States 2020 Presidential Election and civic applications. 
 
The Data 
 
The first and critical question is what data will be appropriate for building a model for 
populism? Has anyone measured the relevant theoretical causes in a systematic way? Are there 
variables that might serve as proxies for more conceptual ideas? My research surfaced no 
complete data sets ready for the analysis we are attempting, but there are numerous pieces 
worthy of wrangling. V-Dem — Varieties of Democracy — publishes data sets with hundreds of 
interval variables dissecting democracy for countries all over the world, including the United 
States. At least roughly 20 of these variables, complete with explanations and scores, correspond 
well with the theoretical variables explored in Part I, such as the “civil society organization 
participatory environment” or the “electoral democracy index.” Combine these select variables 
(some going as far back as 1800) with individually piecemealed data on economic recessions, 
unemployment rates (only going back to 1948), and the age of American democracy at each 
year, and we have a fairly strong set of independent variables to play with.  
On the dependent variable side, a deep dive into U.S. history allows us to categorize 
populism for each year since 1800. This requires both interesting and important judgement calls. 
Although multiple presidents might be argued to have been populist and certainly many populists 
have run for office, only President Andrew Jackson and President Donald Trump are consistently 
referenced and recognized as populist presidents.  Might there be interest in wanting to predict a 14
14 Consider ​The American Conservative​’s “The Five Most Powerful Populist Uprisings In U.S. History” (2017), 
History​’s “Populism In The United States: A Timeline” (2019), and ​Time​’s “10 Elections That Changed America” 
(2008) 
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president versus simply a candidate? Would being able to predict the potential for either be 
enough to take action regardless? Both are probably true. Combining this complication with my 
unemployment data’s limited timeframe, then, I decided to create three U.S. data sets…  
➢ One data set starting in 1800 that marks the presidencies (election to election) of Andrew 
Jackson and Donald Trump as a 1 and their absence as a 0 (narrow) 
➢ A second data set starting in 1800 that marks populist candidates, presidents, and any 
space in between qualifying elections as a 1 and the absence of these cases as a 0 (broad) 
➢ A third data set starting in 1948 that marks populist candidates, presidents, and any space 
in between qualifying elections as a 1 and the absence of these cases  as a 0 (narrow) 
Finally, I decided to mark the populist variable for each American data set to two years 
back, so that the independent variables at a year Y₀ are actually regressed against the dependent 
variable, populism, at year Y₂. This allows us to see how our independent variables are 
correlated with something that takes place in the future, modeling accordingly. I think this is 
important for two reasons. First, populist leadership doesn’t develop instantaneously — it is a 
civic response that builds up to a campaign. Second, if our goal is to build something that may 
hypothetically merit practical application, then we should seek to model something that will 
indicate what our current set of variables may lead to in the coming years. If our model strongly 
indicates that a populist candidate will run in two years, that is a reasonable amount of time to 
take constructive steps that might mitigate the variable causes (answer the people) in a healthy 
way and prevent the degradation of our liberal democracy.  
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Modeling America in R 
 
Model #1: 1800-2017 (Presidents Only) 
 
My first step is using R to chart the correlation of every relevant independent variable in 
the data set with populism, iterating the generalized linear model (glm) with those most strongly 
negatively or positively correlated.  We can see that for this data set, the alternative sources of 15
information index  and party organizations  comprise these ends. 16 17
  
15 Note we could overfit the model with all our variables and get very strong predictive power, but the significance 
of each variable would be rendered worthless. If we want statistically significant independent variables and an 
actionable model, our goal should be to achieve healthy evaluation statistics and select variables of reasonable 
p-values (satisfying at least a 90% confidence interval). 
16 V-Dem Definition: “To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the 
opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?” 
(0-1) 
17 V-Dem Definition: “How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?” (0-4) 
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This means that an increase in the breadth and freedom of media coverage is correlated with an 
increased likelihood of a populist president. On the other side, we see that the cementing of 
national party organizations is negatively correlated with populism. I would speculate that this is 
because it creates a barrier for new parties or party innovators. 
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Fitting the glm with both independent variables in the training subset (even-numbered 
years of the presidents only 1800-2017 data set) and testing it on the odd years yields mixed 
evaluation statistics,  but the coefficient of the party organizations interval is not statistically 18
significant in determining the model outcome, with a p-value of 0.84936​.  
 
 
If we simply remove the party organizations interval, then, we find that there is no impact on the 
evaluation statistics of the glm, the model’s p-value drops to only 2.1704e-06, and the 
McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke ​R² maintain modest values — 0.43, 0.19, and 0.49, 
respectively​.   19
 
Model #2: 1800-2017 (Presidents &  Candidates) 
 
Now working with a more expanded definition of a 1 for the populist dummy, we see that 
social class equality in civil liberty  is most positively correlated and the party organizations 20
variable is the most negatively correlated with populism. Training the glm with these 
18 In this case, accuracy is calculated as the percentage of times the prediction equals the test set’s populist dummy; 
precision as the sum of cases where both the prediction and the test set equal 1 divided by the total ​predicted​ cases; 
recall is the same sum but divided by the total number of ​actual​ cases.  
19 ​R² is the coefficient of determination, indicating how much of the variation in the dependent variable can be 
explained by the model (StatPro “R² (R-SQUARED)”). 
20 V-Dem Definition: “the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic 
groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status.” (0-4) 
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independent variables together, however, results in both mediocre evaluation statistics and the 
party organizations coefficient having fairly poor statistical significance (p-value = 0.128). 
 
Working from the top and bottom of the chart, we can’t find an effective second variable 
to work in the party organizations variable’s place, so we settle for only the social class equality 
in civil liberty variable on its own (statistically significant at a 99.9% confidence interval). 
Unfortunately, we yet again face mixed evaluation statistics (only 40% of cases of populism 
were predicted). Our McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke ​R² values are 0.14, 0.14, and 
0.21, respectively; the model’s p-value is a strong 5.5887e-05.  
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Model #3: 1948-2017 (Presidents &  Candidates) 
 
The most strongly positively correlated independent variable is, once again, the social 
class equality in civil liberty variable and the most negatively correlated is, once again, the party 
organizations. Training the glm with these results in fairly mediocre evaluation statistics 
(although the recall is stronger), with the former coefficient having a strong p-value of 0.032 but 
the latter posting a measly 0.994.  
 
Iterating, we add the next highest positively correlated variable — the civil society 
organization participatory environment   — and replace the next highest negatively correlated 21
variable — the unemployment rate — without spoiling any variable’s statistical significance 
(social class equality in civil liberty still stands at a 95% confidence interval, the CSO 
participatory environment at 90%, and unemployment at 95%). This improves the predictive 
21 V-Dem grants a higher score to the CSO participatory environment variable as the availability of and participation 
in civil society organizations increases. 
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capacity of the model, now managing to predict 91.67% of cases of populism two years in the 
future for the test subset. Our McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke ​R² values are 0.44, 
0.45, and 0.60, respectively; the model’s p-value is a strong 0.00011321. 
  
 
 
Model Analysis 
 
The table below summarizes the 
variable selection and results for the three 
American models we developed, allowing us 
to make a handful of interesting 
observations. First, the 1800-2017 models 
— both with populism narrowly and broadly 
defined — had considerably worse 
predictive strength than the 1948-2017 
model with the populist dummy broadly 
construed. 
For the narrow 1800 model, only having Andrew Jackson’s two terms and a portion of 
Donald Trump’s presidency simply wasn’t enough to train the glm well. That should be no 
45 
 
surprise, but was an interesting exercise. For the broad 1800 model, I suspect some of this is a 
result of the timeframe grappling with a rapidly evolving American context for populism, with 
the Civil War, World I, the Great Depression, and World War II all placing exogenous stress on 
democracy that easily either outweighed natural (or provoked unnatural) fluctuations in the 
variables with which we’re concerned. Ultimately, much of the literature worked through in Part 
I is built on the American story since World War II anyway, with the three decades following 
representing a sort of first phase of the modern era and the techno-economic and cultural changes 
of the 1970s initiating the second. Training and testing a model with data from the past 70 years 
is probably more appropriate, then, as well as more successful. Indeed, defining populism as 
either a candidate or an elected president, this model managed to predict 91.67% of cases of 
populism with independent variable data from two years before their arrival. This is promising.  
 
Model  Independent Variables Evaluation Statistics 
U.S. Data Set #1: 1800-2017 
(Presidents Only) 
Alternative Sources of 
Information  
+ 
Party Organizations 
Accuracy: 96.33% 
Precision: 100% 
Recall: 33.33% 
U.S. Data Set #2: 1800-2017 
(Presidents &  Candidates) 
Social Class Equality in Civil 
Liberty 
Accuracy: 79.82% 
Precision: 40% 
Recall: 44.44% 
U.S. Data Set #3: 1800-2017 
(Presidents &  Candidates)  
Social Class Equality in Civil 
Liberty 
+ 
Unemployment Rate 
+  
Civil Society Organization 
Participatory Environment  
Accuracy: 80% 
Precision: 64.71% 
Recall: 91.67% 
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A second observation, we can comment on the variables themselves and attempt to 
appreciate any correspondence with the outgoing literature on populism (that is, see whether the 
data science corresponds with the social science). Focusing on our most successful model, the 
1948 glm was trained on three independent variables: the civil society organization participatory 
environment (positively correlated), social class equality in civil society (positively correlated), 
and the unemployment rate (negatively correlated).  
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Considering the first, populism does rely on a bed of civic participation, not only in 
voting, but through community meetings, public demonstrations, and social media. Populist 
voters must have both the freedom and willingness to share and congeal around fringe ideas (and 
candidates). The concept of voice and civic engagement as a tool of populism did come up 
briefly in Chapter 3 of Part I, exploring the role of digital media and an evolving public political 
philosophy in opening and transforming political dialogue. Although not focused upon in the 
literature directly, then, the CSO participatory environment fits quite intuitively into the narrative 
of populism we’ve surveyed.  
The second variable, social class equality in civil liberty, may be somewhat surprising at 
first glance. Why would an increase in the equality of classes lead to frustration and a battle 
against elites? Well, perhaps like an increase in access to civil society organizations, more 
equality in civil liberty may ​allow​ the working class to ​finally​ voice its dismay via populist votes. 
On a functional level, then, this makes sense, but I think it’s only truer with historical context.  
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Just consider how America’s score on this aspect of social class equality ranked below 0.5 in 
1800. Over a century of lower class citizens living with an egregious distribution of civil liberties 
very likely has placed a weight of resentment that those with a better yet still subpar share of 
civil liberties are ready to manifest through votes. If increased social class equality in civil 
liberties is a possible tool or opportunity for sharing sentiment, then, maybe the causes discussed 
in Part I are the substance to be shared. 
Finally, the unemployment rate’s negative correlation also does not seem to fit, as 
economic dislocation — a major challenge much of the literature surveyed in Part I focuses on 
— should theoretically be one of our most positively correlated variables. Even more strange is 
that (unlike the equally counter-to-theory negative correlation of the recession dummy) 
unemployment is the ​most​ statistically significant variable in the model (p-value=0.0118). The 
theory on economic dislocation is so consistent and, frankly, reasonable that it seems unwise to 
discount after a few regressions. That said, perhaps we could say unemployment is either not a 
fair proxy for economic dislocation or its interpretation should be changed. 
Techno-economic change and globalization do create some friction in employment, with 
industries dying and jobs being sent abroad. The unemployment rate, however, may or may not 
carry these shifts. What certainly changes is how many segments of workers feel about their 
changing livelihood, from its financial to its socio-cultural implications. I don’t know what 
variable would appropriately represent this, but I suspect it breathes as the motivation behind 
many other variables — perhaps even the aforementioned increases in civic engagement. But 
why would increasing unemployment (or a recession) decrease the probability of populism? I 
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would hypothesize that the insecurity that comes with a weakening economy may make voters 
more willing to settle for a more traditional candidate that will regain control over the situation.  
 
Conclusion: The 2020 Election & Addressing Independent Variables 
 
Although imperfect, our 1948 binary model’s predictive strength begs the question: can 
we predict the 2020 United States Presidential Election? Well, only kind of, because there is 
ambiguity in what a 1 for the populist dummy means. Indeed, using the “predict” function in R 
with our trained glm and data from 2018,  we do find that the probability of populism in 2020 is 22
55.25%, but this doesn’t tell us if that simply means a populist candidate or a populist president. 
If it’s the former, we can confirm that now — Donald Trump is running. If it’s the latter, we 
won’t know until it happens (but I’ll take the credit if it does). As a further note of caution, we 
don’t know how COVID-19 will impact the election, as it represents a significant exogenous 
stress.  
How else might this model be used? Well, hypothetically, governments, companies, and 
communities could run this model (or a much stronger, refined version of it) to identify the 
probability of populism emerging for an upcoming election and act prescriptively on the 
independent variables. For the current iteration, would that mean decreasing access to civil 
society organizations and siphoning civil liberties to the lower classes? Nope, that would in fact 
undermine the liberal democratic values we’re trying to save. Rather, we should invite civic 
engagement and push equality forward, inviting any dormant feelings to surface, but improve our 
efforts at making conversations less partisan and proliferating better ideas as well. More 
22 2018 represents our Y₀ for a Y₂ (2020) prediction.  
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accessible educational resources, debate-friendly classrooms and civic spaces, and a willingness 
to speak on and appreciate the terms of left- and right-wing populists may not only allow 
populists to feel heard, but compel moderates to address their genuine concerns as well — all 
before a polarizing candidate is elected. Further, political radicals would be asked to grapple with 
humanizing perspectives of their opponents, with both statistics and anecdotes stimulating 
moderation. This may sound simple. It’s not. It requires extraordinary patience, humility, and 
bravery, resting some of our most foundational assumptions in order to learn from and address 
the concerns of our peers, as well as adding depth to our arguments. Also note how such work 
will likely be most successful at the local level and inherently carries an intimation of 
communitarianism. But perhaps that is part of the solution, bringing a little moralizing (small ‘r’) 
republicanism into our liberal democracy in order to prevent an unhealthy descent into the 
extremely moralistic, exclusionary purview of populism.  
More and better conversation, not less, is what gives us a fighting chance.  
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Appendix A: Data Set Samples 
 
U.S. Data Set #1: 1800-2017 (Presidents Only) 
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U.S. Data Set #2: 1800-2017 (Presidents & Candidates) 
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U.S. Data Set #3: 1948-2017 (Presidents & Candidates) 
 
54 
 
Appendix B: Regressions 
 
U.S. Data Set #1: 1800-2017 (Presidents Only) 
➢ Regressing both the alternative sources of information index and party organizations 
against populism 
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➢ Regressing only party organizations 
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U.S. Data Set #2: 1800-2017 (Presidents & Candidates) 
➢ Regressing both social class equality in civil liberty and party organizations 
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➢ Regressing both barriers to parties and freedom of academic and cultural expression 
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U.S. Data Set #3: 1948-2017 (Presidents & Candidates) 
➢ Regressing both civil society organization participatory environment and unemployment 
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➢ Regressing civil society organization participatory environment, unemployment, and 
freedom of religious and cultural expression. 
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P​ART ​III​: ​T​HE ​M​IND OF ​D​EMOS 
 
 
 
“After all, in an age of fake news, what better way to tell the truth than through fiction?” 
 
 
— Simon Gauthier 
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Forward 
McKenna Stevens 
 
I came across this strange manuscript fifteen years ago while doing research at Claremont 
McKenna College. It was the turn of the century, I was young, and the last thing I wanted to do, 
quite frankly, was spend time in the sleepy (albeit charming) town of Claremont. But alas, there 
was rich intellectual material to draw from there, so I took to the work forcefully. I was 
stipended to analyze and consolidate all of the leading political commentary published during 
the Populist Era, the period I teach on today. The library archives and professors available to me 
offered numerous valuable examples of early twenty-first century political insight, from papers 
to books to articles that were being published at the time. The most interesting and fickle little 
piece I came across, however, was​ The Mind of Demos​ — one of Oliver Wolf’s first long poems, 
apparently falling into obscurity well before the celebrated writer published his era-defining 
Synaesthesia ​in 2029.  
It was an old, stout professor — known among his undergraduate students for 
fluctuating between archaic banter and eccentric insight — who heard me venting to a 
colleague about the dryness and repetition of my work, and scurried to his office to find me an 
old copy of this peculiar text. Based on the layer of dust my fingers met on the cover, I could 
only assume this document hadn’t been touched in years, yet this professor thought of it almost 
instinctively. I knew I was holding something special, but as I flipped through the pages only to 
find poetry, my face must have betrayed some doubt. I looked up to see the professor’s assuring 
stare:   
“If you want something fresh from the Populist Era, consider this. They should have.” 
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I read ​The​ ​Mind of Demos ​that night, delighting in it personally but referencing it sparsely in my 
final report. How could I? I was a 27-year old postdoc paid to study and summarize the finest 
and most enlightening intellectual literature of the Populist Era, not to sell the significance of a 
twenty-first century poet’s college thoughts. But now, after more than a decade of teaching 
with the obscure work (long out of print), I believe it’s time for the world to appreciate Wolf’s 
lost poem, peering into the dilemmas our democracy faced before the Great Transformation in 
a beautiful way.  
The following poem is divided into six cantos, allegorizing the rise and nature of 
populism that swept through the globe during Wolf’s years at Claremont McKenna. Bolstering 
the reader’s experience, I have included two of the most productive commentaries that were 
written for Wolf as he prepared to make his case for publication. The first was written by 
Andrew Aristaeus, a modestly successful professor of government who taught in Claremont 
(but to my knowledge, had little to no direct interaction with the young Wolf). The second was 
written by Simon Gauthier, a well-respected political commentator at the time who apparently 
met Wolf’s thesis reader years before at Oxford.  
Open yourself up to the experience you are about to embark on. Yes, it is a relic of a 
bygone era — when private money was in politics, two parties pretended to contain our views, 
and political thinkers still couldn’t catch the misnomer of liberalism — but it is a signal of the 
change that was building up in people’s hearts at the time. Further, its lessons may reinvigorate 
one’s passion to stay committed to our community councils and town halls, to keep democracy 
healthy and never let our voices fall sick to the Plague.  
Cheers, 
MS 
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The Mind of Demos 
By Oliver Wolf 
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Canto I 
 
We so often venerate those 
who can manage to model 
how the Past worked its way  
to the Present; 
these are the historians — 
the students of Time — 
who have the benefit of perspective 
to see steps of degradation, 
the charge of change, 
10  distinct moments giving way  
to a narrative 
of which we are  
a period. 
 
But who is brave enough to tell the Truth 
as it is, as we are  
now 
so as not to retroactively 
assert our victimhood  
to the Shadow, but to let us dance with it? 
 
20 I am the conscious child of my age — 
brutal in my honesty, 
aware of my manipulation, 
curious enough to look, 
brave enough to dodge  
the press of paradigm — 
and I will tell the Truth of the Shadow 
of the Enlightened Balance, 
 
beginning with the Plague that disrupted 
its peace, the Mind of Demos. 
30  She had lived at once connectedly conscious, 
possessing that communicative neurology,  
but the Plague slipped  
beneath her skin and bone, 
67 
 
founding a bicameral psychology; 
the hemispheres of the Mind of Demos 
are of their own characters now,  
disconnected, 
and so the Mind’s Enlightened Balance 
has fallen to the Shadow. 
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Canto II 
 
40  The Mind of Demos did not know 
how sick it had become 
until it tried to think,  
to reflect, to believe 
as once before. 
The Plague had brought forth  
a schism with the shroud, 
that Shadow — 
The Left and the Right 
halves of the Mind 
50 now feel severed and distant, 
like a city split by the derision  
of two  
tectonic plates. 
 
But this distance is a deception, 
for the Shadow — 
wrought by the Plague — 
has merely played on the fears and weakness 
of the Mind to push the Left and Right 
further into themselves,  
60 retreating to the safer recesses of thought. 
 
And what can be said of their dreams? 
They have gone mute 
and do not know how 
to be heard. 
They cry out, begging 
for a chance to escape their fall  
further into the forgotten darkness 
of the Mind of Demos. 
 
These dreams —  
70 tired, 
weak, and  
alone — 
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gathered to find validation, 
to find their voice 
by traveling to meet ​Et Collectivum Conscientia 
that had first given them life, 
a time when Demos  
looked in the mirror 
and knew herself,  
80 but now that glass is fractured 
and ​Et Collectivum Conscientia  
has nothing to tell the dreams;  
it no longer recognizes them 
and the dreams have been left 
to find a cure. 
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Canto III 
 
Those dreams who had traveled  
to question ​Et Collectivum Conscientia 
stood at the edge of their respective halves, 
unable to see what lay beyond the Shadow, 
90 and so the dreams fled 
deep into all they had, 
the Left or the Right, 
in the pursuit of their own  
vitality, 
existence, 
hope. 
 
The dreams of the Left 
found a voice: a savior 
for the forgotten dreams, 
100 the Savior of Tradition, 
who called out: 
“Gather around you forgotten dreams, 
the pious who have waited 
patiently in the Mind of Demos! 
The Plague has pushed you 
down into darkness, as ​Et Collectivum Conscientia 
Grows weak and fails to remember  
its promise to pursue you. 
But are you forgotten dreams 
110 not the true consciousness  
of the Mind of Demos? 
Is it not your time 
to speak once more, to be 
the first thought? 
Yes! It is time for ​Et Collectivum Conscientia 
to fall, for it has stood by and watched the Plague  
silence you forgotten dreams, 
left without a purpose,  
unable to compete with a new 
120 neurology; and who has taken their attention? 
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The Other Dreams! 
Those foreign fantasies 
who fight to foment your realization,  
greeting Demos, asking her to help, 
only to take the Mind 
that was once yours to call 
home. 
 
I am the Savior of Tradition, 
and I have seen  
130 your silent struggle, but ask you 
to be silent no more! Write 
in the Book of the Mind of Demos 
and your words will be seen by all 
who care to read them; 
sign onto the virtues of old 
so we might realize all forgotten dreams, 
the real dreams. 
Trust me, confide in me, give me your words 
and I will give you back the Mind, 
140 then you will be heard.” 
 
And the forgotten dreams of the Left 
cried and held each other 
at the thought of being  
heard once more, 
taking to the Book 
to make their requests  
known in the absence  
of a voice. 
Pages were filled with beliefs of old  
150 and when one wrote a line 
that dishonored the Savior 
he was shamed and crossed off, 
forbidden from the page. 
The Savior of Tradition read and learned  
the shape of this new consciousness, 
memorizing the words they used 
so as to become a mirror 
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for the forgotten dreams of the Left. 
 
And likewise the dreams of the Right 
160 found a voice: a savior 
for the new dreams, the Savior of Justice, 
who called out:  
“Gather around you new dreams, 
the hopeful who have sprouted 
up in the Mind of Demos! 
The Plague has pushed you 
down into darkness, as ​Et Collectivum Conscientia 
grows weak and fails to imagine 
a better future with you. 
170 But are you new dreams 
not the rising conscience 
of the Mind of Demos? 
Is it not your time 
to finally speak, to be 
the just thought? 
Yes! It is time for ​Et Collectivum Conscientia 
to fall, for it has stood in apathy, 
watching the Plague 
silence you new dreams, 
180 left to engender the void 
with your purpose, 
unable to compete with  
a gentrified neurology; and who 
might be our ally? 
The Other Dreams! 
Those foreign creatives 
who fight for realization, greeting 
Demos, asking her to listen, 
Devoting themselves to her Mind 
190 that we may all call 
home. 
 
I am the Savior of Justice, 
and I have seen  
your silent struggle, but ask you 
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to be silent no more! Write 
in the Book of the Mind of Demos 
and your words will be seen by all 
who care to read them; 
sign onto the rights we are owed, 
200 so we might realize all dreams, 
the deserving dreams. 
Trust me, confide in me, give me your words 
and I will give you, at last, 
the Mind of Demos, 
then you will be heard.” 
 
And the new dreams of the Right 
cried and held each other, 
joined by the Other Dreams, 
at the thought of finally being heard 
210 for the first time, 
taking to the Book 
to make their requests 
known in the absence 
of a voice. 
Pages were filled with new rights 
and when one wrote a line 
that dishonored the Savior 
they were shamed and crossed off, 
forbidden from the page. 
220 The Savior of Tradition read and learned  
the shape of this new conscience, 
memorizing the words they used 
so as to become a mirror 
for the new dreams of the Right. 
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Canto IV 
 
Now that ubiquitous Book 
of the Mind of Demos 
was a powerful force for dreams, 
as all were endowed  
with a pen to write 
230 what lay dormant 
on the tongue, 
the rest of the Mind 
channeling this signal throughout, 
even across hemispheres — 
a blockchain of sentiment.  
 
The Book might allow dreams 
of the Left and the Right 
to reach one another 
across the Shadow 
240 that had set them apart 
in the Mind of Demos; 
they needn’t talk, 
nor touch, 
yet understand even still 
(that is the beauty of thinking) 
the pains of the forgotten and the new 
(and the Other Dreams), 
but alas, the Plague 
drove deeper into Demos, 
250 not only stealing the throats of dreams, 
but infecting language itself, 
an illness made manifest 
in the Book. 
 
Those of the Left 
held words with a static 
power; they demanded 
consistency in terms 
and, further,  
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the beliefs 
260 to which they referenced.  
 
How else might the forgotten dreams 
reclaim the virtues of old 
and reignite as  
the first thought, 
except by holding onto 
a cord of continuity 
tethered to the Past? 
 
For the Left, meaning 
is a metaphor 
270 attached to its term 
and allowing Time 
to kill its continuity  
was to surrender the Truth  
once related 
forever. 
 
Those of the Right 
found new ways  
to wield words; 
they re-tuned terms to pair 
280 with the Mind of Demos  
as it evolved. 
 
How else might 
the new dreams  
define what was right 
and ignite just thoughts, 
except by letting go 
of what words had grown 
wrong and reassigning them 
to reality?  
 
290 For the Right, meaning  
is a metaphor 
attached to its term 
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and allowing Time 
to kill its continuity 
was to empower the Truth 
to relate 
forever.  
 
And so the Left and Right 
claimed their pages in the Book 
300 of the Mind of Demos, 
grouping language  
according to their liking, 
never seeing its limits, 
only understanding how to release, 
but never accept, 
words, 
expunging those blotches 
of mental burden — 
the false installments — 
310 wherever they found them.  
 
The Book of the Mind 
is now one divided into  tribes  of  ideas, 
illegible to Demos. 
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Canto V 
 
As life so often challenges us, 
it was time for the Mind of Demos 
to decide how it would believe — 
which dreams on which Demos 
would dwell. 
 
Such determination —  
320 not merely the act  
of thinking, but 
an awareness of how 
and why — 
is both a gift of consciousness 
Demos treasured 
and the responsibility of ​Et Collectivum Conscientia​. 
 
The leaders of the dreams 
circulating in the Mind of Demos — 
the Savior of Tradition and  
330 the Savior of Justice — 
filled the mind-space 
at the request of ​Et Collectivum Conscientia​, 
calling on the dreams 
of the Left, the Right, 
and those Other Dreams 
(who had entered Demos 
in days prior) 
to engage in this ritual 
of reflection, 
340 this determination 
of Mind. 
 
And the dialogue of Demos commenced, 
as the Savior of Tradition 
began: 
“Time has brought us another chance  
to decide what the Mind of Demos 
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will believe, which convictions 
it will have, 
which dreams will occupy 
350 its conscious thoughts: ​Et Collectivum Conscientia​. 
 
Recently, the Mind 
has flowed quite liberally, 
ideas are of equal weight 
and progress is measured 
as the accumulation of facts — 
the wealth of words, ideas, and experiences — 
Demos might enjoy; 
indeed, a liberated Mind has done well at this, 
but it has also made the Mind 
 
360 weak.  
 
What is a liberated Mind of Demos worth 
if dreams are left without a purpose, 
a concept of the good? 
The old dreams —  
the forgotten dreams of the Left — 
know this.  
There was a time 
when the wealth of information  
was not all that mattered, 
370 but the way it was used — 
the dreams it drew — 
was of concern.  
 
Dormant, unconscious dreams of old, 
of the Left, 
of nobler reason, 
claim your power once more!” 
 
The Savior of Justice 
stepped forward into this crowd  
of stirred nerves: 
380 “The Mind of Demos has indeed 
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thoughts as one liberated 
and that has brought on a rush  
of ideas, facts, and experiences, 
but is this alone a problem? 
After all, such liberty  
has given us the gift of the Other Dreams. 
 
No, the problem is how our wealth 
of information favors some dreams 
who ascend the mind-space  
390 over others. 
Many of these spoiled dreams  
are dreams of the Left — 
analytical, conniving, scheming 
to be at the surface of thoughts  
in the Mind of Demos.  
 
But the new dreams, the dreams of the Right 
are lost for lack of connection 
in the Mind, 
new to the neurology, 
400 and so I reach out 
in remonstration of the Left, 
on behalf of the imagination  
of the Right, 
so you new dreams  
might leave your drudgery, 
in the unconscious Mind of Demos!”   
 
The Savior of Tradition raged 
against the words of the Right: 
“How dare you call on the Other Dreams 
410 as part of your cause! 
Do you have no regard 
for the Mind of Demos 
as one pure, untinged  
by a feeling foreign to its person? 
You have no loyalty  
but to the transient  
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sway of sentiment 
that haunts the Mind. 
You, Savior of Justice, are an unjust 
420 facade of a solution 
who would damn Demos 
to a conscience 
without foundation.” 
 
“No!” proclaimed the Savior of Justice, 
“I reflect the calls of dreams 
who have long waited 
for the rights of thought 
preached by the dreams of the Left. 
I stand for all dreams as equal, 
430 as beautiful, 
for Demos to meditate on 
as she deems them worthy, 
informed by what her liberated 
Mind captures in life. 
Such is a call for the good, 
what you confuse 
with tradition.” 
 
For one last strike 
against the Savior of Justice, 
440 the Savior of Tradition 
closed:  
“Who are you to speak of the good 
and deface tradition 
(and the generations of dreams 
who exist by it)? 
You speak of the good, 
of something moral, as if 
you’ve made an argument  
to validate it as such. 
 
450 My lost friend, your justice 
is a pandering projection, 
an amalgamation of emotion 
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attempting to reflect whatever the Right 
has spotted, invented, identified, 
so you might capture  
what constitutes as character, 
if only for a blink of Demos’ eye. 
 
You call for information 
without justification, 
460 You call for inclusion 
without regard for culture, 
You call for a new conscience 
without heeding memory — 
the memory of the Mind of Demos.  
 
You are an empty echo 
 
of the Plague that brought us here.” 
 
Dreams were held in awe, some 
filled with hope, 
others 
470 filled with anxiety, 
knowing how little else could be done, 
as the oration of the Savior of Tradition 
trumped all that could be said; 
 
it didn’t matter whether it was of Truth. 
 
Some dreams considered their own existence, 
others took to the Book of the Mind of Demos 
to plead their points, 
and still others held each other 
 
quietly. 
 
480 It was time for the Mind of Demos 
to sleep,  
so that all the unconscious dreams might join 
in the reflection of ​Et Collectivum Conscientia​, 
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uniting to determine the fate 
of Demos — 
who would shake that Shadow 
and  
cure her consciousness of the Plague who incited 
the darkness?  
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Canto VI 
 
490 When Demos awoke, 
the consciousness of the Mind — 
Et Collectivum Conscientia ​— 
had been claimed by the Savior of Tradition, 
the Left had commanded language 
to manipulate the Mind, 
fooling itself into conceding  
consciousness to the promises 
of protection, 
the rhetoric of the real. 
 
500 Despite this new conscious belief, 
Demos is still sick 
and new dreams remain 
in the unconscious.  
Information continued to flow, 
favoring the once forgotten 
dreams of the Left, 
who felt their voice return. 
The Savior of Tradition claims 
the Plague has passed, 
510 but the Mind of Demos has yet 
to find its past union of the Left and Right. 
The Book of the Mind of Demos 
can attest to this division. 
 
The fall of voices 
weakened the faith of dreams 
in their place, 
marshalling mania in the medium  
of the Book; 
this atrophy of the articulate 
520 rewarded a tragedy  
of tradition — 
one that will only triumph again 
upon future reflections, 
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unless 
dutiful dreams of mutual doubt 
and humble hope 
slide into the psychology of the Left, 
celebrating those sentiments 
born of reason  
530 and bearing words of patient bravery  
where wisdom is absent. 
Their voices feel empty, 
but there is power  
in listening.  
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The First Comment 
Andrew Aristaeus 
 
When I was approached by a colleague to comment on the yet published cantos of her student,                                 
Oliver, I think I was a bit unnerved. I — a tenured professor of government — was supposed to                                     
take the time to read a 21-year old literature major’s attempt at allegorizing populism? Even if                               
my pride was not a vice to negotiate, it seemed strange in principle. It was made clear to me,                                     
however, that this was no ordinary student, nor a meek attempt at political commentary. Fair                             
enough. I could humor the rapacious undergrad and read through a modest 534 lines. Although                             
I cannot celebrate Oliver’s work as an entirely fair tale of our current political landscape, I have                                 
found it intriguing enough to warrant a few words. 
 
Lines: 40-60 
If there is anything Oliver has gotten right, it is that we are sick as a democracy (or a                                     
“Mind of Demos” as he calls it). Our ability to communicate — “to think” — has deteriorated and                                   
this has contributed to increased polarization. I also agree that this distance is a deception, as                               
we continue to share the same common land, cities, jobs, and hobbies as before. The distance                               
between us is contrived, but poignant nonetheless.  
 
Lines: 69-76 
Here is the first of a few spots where Oliver strikes me as a bit cutesy, romantic, or                                   
perhaps, just plain soft. Do we really need the government (what I assume to be ​Et Collectivum                                 
Conscientia​) to give us validation? To give us back our voice? Sure, it is fair to identify the lack of                                       
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access to many of our government officials, but is this not — more than anything — a practical                                   
reality of a growing population? Many people (or “dreams”, I think) would do well to develop a                                 
little self-agency. 
 
Lines: 97-158 
I must admit, Oliver had me scratching my head when I first read of the “Left”                               
hemisphere and its “Savior of Tradition”. How could we possibly consider the liberals to be on                               
the side of tradition? But the young man has done something clever (finally). Indeed, I am                               
pleased to see that the political right has been allegorized as the left hemisphere — a bit more                                   
analytical and less prone to imagination than its right counterpart. I also appreciate the                           
apparent sympathy for the “forgotten dreams” (we would do well to remember the moral                           
backbone of this country). 
I am less sold, however, on the idea that the government must fall for the forgotten                               
dreams to be remembered, but I guess that’s a criticism of extreme politics Oliver and I share.                                 
Our mutuality cuts sharply, though, on the point of the “Other Dreams” (the immigrants,                           
clearly). When it comes to politics and government, we need to make choices. We are in the                                 
midst of a period of significant economic transformation and many low- to mid-skill jobs have                             
been threatened, so why would we invite a host of new citizens to compete for these slim spots                                   
and further undermine the stability of our people, many of whom fought for those jobs already?                               
This should not be taken as a criticism of the immigrants themselves, but alas, xenophobic                             
“othering” is clearly the politically-packed allusion Oliver is gunning for.  
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Lines: 159-191 
Well, this does sound like the political left’s pitch. I was a bit dismayed, however, to see                                 
the apparent dichotomy between the forgotten dreams and “new dreams” (the youth). I                         
understand that on a literary level this makes for a cleaner story, but would the youth not                                 
benefit from the truths and good sense of old? But enough on that little critique. I was pleased                                   
to read the following few lines: 
…you new dreams, 
left to engender the void 
with your purpose 
 
Although subtle, Oliver has noted the tendency of the left to be somewhat fanciful, developing 
narratives any which way to suit their fancy. These narratives are then pushed to elicit emotion 
that (somehow) authorizes rights the state must provide. One such narrative is that of the 
immigrant, who has been characterized as uniquely deserving of protection and inclusion. Why 
should anyone be obligated to vie for their “realization” (line 197)? This is how a simple legal 
concept of borders has turned into a major emotional target of the political left. I believe 
foreign-born persons have the same personal worth as domestic citizens, but the positive rights 
Oliver must be alluding to with a term like realization are, ultimately, legal questions. 
 
Lines: 225-310  
So what is this “Book of the Mind of Demos” to which Oliver devotes Canto IV? At first, I                                     
thought things could be getting quite layered here; I think it wants to be a riddle. What is                                   
something “ubiquitous” where we can “write what lay dormant on the tongue” so that anyone                             
can read it, “a blockchain of sentiment”? Voting? Couldn’t be. The internet? Warmer. Social                           
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media? Maybe Facebook, specifically? Oliver was really just hitting the reader in the face with                             
this throwing around a capitalized label like “Book” at us again and again. I would’ve rolled my                                 
eyes if it hadn’t taken me a good minute to get it myself. 
This canto gets interesting for me, however, when the Book quickly becomes a                         
conversation about language. One of populism’s key traits is the erosion of civil exchange, with                             
the political left and right’s basest colors clashing. Oliver tries to parse this out by sculpting the                                 
“Left” and “Right” approaches to communication. In keeping with what I will admit is an artful                               
exploitation of grade school neurology, the former hemisphere wields language with precision;                       
the words mean something reliably, while the latter assigns meaning to words as it deems fit                               
(and I think Oliver is generous to say this is done in the spirit of “Truth”). Now, as a professor of                                         
government, I have always felt it important that words mean what they mean, and so it would                                 
seem Oliver might toss me into the right-wing populist milieu. That’s a damn shame. Is there                               
really no moderate position for people who believe in a little healthy stability of terms? 
 
Lines: 351-372 
Oliver’s allegorical plot really reaches its peak in Canto V. I particularly like what seems                             
to be a critique of liberalism in the Savior of Tradition’s opening statement in a public debate (I                                   
like to think of it as an homage to the great orators of Athens, the first democracy). The                                   
communitarian nature (albeit an exhausting one) of many right-wing populists does often seem                         
to be a reaction to stifling liberalism. Not all “ideas are of equal weight” and more is not always                                     
more. That seems to come out well in lines 367-72: 
There was a time 
when the wealth of information  
was not all that mattered, 
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but the way it was used — 
the dreams it drew — 
was of concern.  
This is a call for civic virtue and better character — to go about personal gain with meaningful 
vision. It’s disappointing that such a reasonable statement needs to be delivered by a right-wing 
populist leader, whose rhetoric grows more and more hateful.   
 
Lines: 387-395 
The populist left does indeed tend to characterize wealthy (and apparently conservative) 
individuals as “analytical, conniving, scheming” in its calls for wealth redistribution. Oliver 
seems to be doing a fair job here of capturing some of the bite (warranted or not) of leftists. I 
worry at times, however, that Oliver actually aligns himself with these dreams, as he 
periodically betrays a bit of sympathy, I think. 
 
Lines: 508-534 
My last point of interest is Oliver’s mention that the Savior of Tradition has yet to build 
any unity, and further, that a path forward actually seems to rest on both hemispheres, or 
political sides. It’s true that an election does not somehow fix things. I also agree that the 
left-wing populists and the political left as a whole will need to dip into some nuance if they 
want things to change. The left must speak in moral terms, admit where the political right 
seems justified (throw ‘em a bone), and speak with some real wisdom. Finally, closing a poem 
that constantly pulled me in only to elicit a furrowed brow, Oliver rightly says the above solution 
begins with listening. What a good lesson this would be for all of us.  
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The Second Comment 
Simon Gauthier 
 
An anonymous professor at Claremont McKenna College — a school that is as highly-ranked as 
it is unknown — reached out to me a few months ago to see what I thought of her undergrad’s 
poem. The student, Oliver Wolf, was trying to allegorize the rise and nature of populism 
through six cantos for his senior thesis. Now, I’m used to looking for the next great story, but I 
usually don’t turn to the cantos of a philosophy, politics, and economics undergrad to find it. I 
trusted this professor, though. After all, in an age of fake news, what better way to tell the truth 
than through fiction? I took a look through the manuscript on my way to the studio, one hand 
coddling the stapled pages and the other clenching a grab handle on the train. Although I, 
frankly, can’t say whether Oliver’s work will catch a hold of the public’s attention (and if it does, 
whether it will last), I am certain that the young man has made a worthwhile, albeit imperfect, 
contribution to the political dialogue of our time.  
 
Lines: 20-27 
It’s beautiful to see a young person so free and taking ownership of their place in time. 
Through his words, Oliver does strike me as almost overconfident, but his self-awareness and 
intentions seem too clear to knock him harshly for it. Everyone has a mic today, so at least he is 
trying to say something. 
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Lines: 40-44 
After discussing politics on major networks nearly everyday for over a decade and 
publishing (strictly non-fiction, of course) a few times myself, I can state confidently that our 
democracy is truly ill. We are not thinking well as a nation; this is toxic. That said, I would 
suggest that it’s okay if we’re not able “to believe, to reflect, to believe as once before” (lines 
42-4). It’s okay if we change or evolve, but it must be healthy.  
 
Lines: 61-85 
Oliver is right, many of the “dreams” (people) of the “Mind of Demos” (democracy or 
community, right?)  have lost their voice in this time of big money politics and inaccessible 
representatives. A single person’s civic agency has eroded. I think Oliver might be missing 
something, however, and that’s the dreams who have never been heard — who never had a 
voice. I don’t pretend to know exactly how you fit a history of injustice related to race, gender, 
or sexuality into the allegorical world Oliver’s built, and I don’t think the allegory falls too short 
with its exclusion, but it’s worth noting nonetheless.  
 
Lines: 97-127 
Well, this was awkward. I was quite liking this “Savior of Tradition” and the “Left” until I 
reached the xenophobic lines on the “Other Dreams” (immigrants, foreigners) and realized 
what I was reading. I quickly understood that the “Left” hemisphere was really the political 
right, making the “Right” the political left. This was irritating, because there’s some subtle 
psychological commentary that logically follows (the analytical left-brain versus the creative 
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right-brain types of people). This made me a little self-conscious and also struck me as 
reductive, but then I realized that it was a young poet — a​ creative​ — who had set this dichotomy 
in his clean allegorical world. This leads me to believe Oliver doesn’t actually believe the political 
sides are really this clean cut and this is simply an easy way of parsing out a ​trend​. (Either that, 
or Oliver is implicitly admitting his unabashed leftism). 
 
Lines: 154-158 
This does look like the kind of manipulation and strategy indicative of right-wing 
populist leaders. 
 
Lines: 163-175 
I think Oliver is right to observe how the left-wing populists view the youth as “the rising 
conscience” of our democracy. This is something I share with the populist left and, frankly, 
wish we all could appreciate. The youth aren’t jaded by societal wrongs the way many of us “old” 
folk might be. It’s easy to talk about age and tradition, but is it so easy to justify how the length 
of a pattern of belief somehow makes it right? With a little more salt than pepper on my head, 
I’m not so sure it is.  
 
Lines: 225-253 
What an interesting device? A “Book of the Mind of Demos” that transcends physical 
space and transmits words throughout? Sounds like social media, which would be quite an 
appropriate component of the populist phenomenon to include on Oliver’s part. So much of the 
93 
 
way we communicate and engage in civic discourse is through a screen now, and the anonymity 
of screens has allowed populist rhetoric to run rampant online. 
 
Lines: 268-297 
I appreciate Oliver targeting the way the political right and left approach language, as 
their incongruence has made for an unhealthy democratic dialogue. I think right-wing 
populists (and the political right in general) are wildly too protective of words’ meanings. 
Language is a construct; we assigned some words to our world in the past, why can’t we 
reassign them now? It is regressive to hold the lives of people — living, breathing people — back 
because we refuse to change the language we use around them, to validate them. If the right 
wants to talk about using our morals, let’s start with our mouths. In order to treat one another 
as we’d want to be treated, we must recognize one another as we recognize ourselves.  
 
Lines: 351-372 
This is where the right-wing populist critique of liberalism comes out, and I think it 
demonstrates the right’s failure to appreciate how supposedly “amoral” liberalism really 
authorizes morality. We can exercise ethical decision-making with more options and freedoms; 
liberalism is the freedom to make a choice. Choosing to do a good thing is what makes an action 
virtuous, as Adam Smith (of all people) writes in his ​Theory of Moral Sentiments ​(capitalists would 
do well to take a break from ​Wealth of Nations​ and spend a few minutes in this text...something 
to consider). 
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Lines:  391-406 
Although I disagree with the idea that all the wealthy are “analytical, conniving, 
scheming” and conservative as Oliver’s “Savior of Justice” states, I do think we’ve set the youth 
up for failure. The “new dreams” (youth) are not prepared to take on “the neurology” (what I 
assume represents the financial economy? The economy of ideas?). We’ve made education, 
healthy living, and political representation all difficult to access, all while the economy evolves 
faster and faster. We obviously need more publicly-supplied job training, free public college 
education, and free healthcare. It’s unfortunate that such reasonable steps are only preached by 
leftists. 
 
Lines: 508-534 
Oliver is right. Despite whatever our elected Savior of Tradition wants to believe, the 
country is not united and it seems like Oliver knows that it never really can be under populist 
leadership. What does unite us? The very thing that divided us, that is currently infected: 
language. We need less “mania in the medium of the Book” and a little more healthy 
conversation and reflection. But as much I appreciate Oliver calling on the political left to 
practice better listening and healthier dialogue with the right, I think he fails to emphasize 
what the right will need to do on its part (this gap makes his prognosis almost sound like 
“right-wing esque” victim blaming). Indeed, there must be a little “bravery” and “wisdom” on 
the part of conservatives if right-populists are going to change.  
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